Ethics Are Admin: Australian Human Research Ethics Review Forms as (Un)Ethical Actors by Whelan, Andrew M
University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts
2018
Ethics Are Admin: Australian Human Research
Ethics Review Forms as (Un)Ethical Actors
Andrew M. Whelan
University of Wollongong, awhelan@uow.edu.au
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Publication Details
Whelan, A. (2018). Ethics Are Admin: Australian Human Research Ethics Review Forms as (Un)Ethical Actors. Social Media and
Society, 4 (2), 1-9.
Ethics Are Admin: Australian Human Research Ethics Review Forms as
(Un)Ethical Actors
Abstract
In Australian universities, social research projects secure institutional approval as ethical through research
ethics committees, and are defined and communicated to these committees through standardized local
application forms. In organizational terms, ethics are instituted first as an administrative ritual anterior to
research, and routinely elided as such. The documentation constituting this ritual thus bears scrutiny, in terms
of what it says and what it does, and in turn, what it requires applicants to say and do. Such scrutiny is a means
of fleshing out the standard critique of prospective ethics review from social media researchers: that the
opportunity for a proper conversation about research ethics in the community of researchers is supplanted by
an administrative exercise in "box ticking." This paper discusses these ethics application forms, attending
specifically to the ethical consequences of the stance they require the applicant to take with respect to
prospective research participants, and the implications of their formulation of research as a process of data
extraction.
Publication Details
Whelan, A. (2018). Ethics Are Admin: Australian Human Research Ethics Review Forms as (Un)Ethical
Actors. Social Media and Society, 4 (2), 1-9.
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/3680
https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305118768815
Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BY-NC:  This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction  
and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages  
(https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
Social Media + Society
April-June 2018: 1 –9 
© The Author(s) 2018
Reprints and permissions: 
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI  10.1177/2056305118768815
journals.sagepub.com/home/sms
SI: Ethics as Method
Introduction
In Australian universities, the status of being ethical is 
assigned to research, first and formally, in advance: to a 
research project design, in the shape of approval of an appro-
priately filled out form. This article consists of an engage-
ment with these forms, and the master document they index. 
These documents are shown to have implications for research 
ethics as a social practice to be described via the forms, and 
for how research itself is to be understood and evaluated as a 
form of knowledge production.
The following is thus based on a review of procedural eth-
ics documentation from 10 Australian universities: Curtin, 
Deakin, Griffith, Macquarie, QUT, RMIT, University of 
Wollongong (the employer of this author), University of 
Tasmania, University of Technology Sydney and Western 
Sydney University. The ethics policies and procedures at the 
listed universities are representative of those in place at all 
Australian universities. Australian ethics review is not radi-
cally dissimilar to that conducted in Canada, the United 
Kingdom, or the United States, though the Australian context 
has not been as thoroughly addressed (but see Macintyre, 
2014; Mooney-Somers & Olsen, 2017; Thomson, Breen, & 
Chalmers, 2016). Readers unfamiliar with the Australian 
system may find it instructive to consider how the particu-
larities of national context are exhibited in the Australian 
forms, and how Australian ethics processes may differ from 
those found in the reader’s own context.
There is a robust critical literature addressing regulatory 
ethics oversight from qualitative social researchers (e.g., Gross, 
2012; Guta, Nixon, & Wilson, 2013; Halse & Honey, 2007; 
Hammersley, 2010; Lincoln, 2005; Macintyre, 2014). There is 
also a strong critique of administrative ethics from digital social 
researchers and researchers interested in social media, for 
whom administrative ethics procedures throw up specific chal-
lenges (see, for example, Buchanan & Ess, 2009; Ess, 2002; 
Markham & Buchanan, 2015; Thomas, 2004; Zimmer, 2010).
In the established critiques, ethics review is not com-
monly explored with reference to research on administrative 
documents, such as that emanating from anthropology of 
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bureaucracy (Hull, 2012; Lowenkron & Ferreira, 2014), or 
work in the ethnomethodological tradition (Kameo & 
Whalen, 2015; Turner, 2014). These latter bodies of work are 
productive here in that they direct attention directly to docu-
ments as material artifacts which organize people and prac-
tices around them. From this perspective, a central question 
is: “What does a given suite of documents do and require and 
enable people to do?”
In institutional terms, ethics are not already there as a fea-
ture of social interaction and exchange (such as research): 
they are already there as a compulsory administrative proce-
dure instituted anterior to research taking place, and rou-
tinely elided as such. Unpacking the ethical ramifications of 
this achievement is a way of fleshing out the established cri-
tiques of prospective ethics review, where the opportunity 
for a meaningful conversation about ethics is supplanted by 
an exercise in “box ticking” (see, for example, Katz, 2006; 
Schrag, 2011).
Ethics forms play a central role in establishing what 
research actually is, and they also require those who fill them 
out to show and say they see the world in a particular way 
and not in other ways—to profess particular stances. This is 
nominally merely assenting to practice a formalist, precau-
tionary ethics in an immanent elsewhere. However, if we 
stop limiting ethics to research practice exclusively, bracket-
ing them from organizational practices with apparently dif-
ferent ethical ontologies, we can see that the expectations 
and requirements of the form have ethical implications. The 
form is an ethical actor. Ethics forms and the family of docu-
ments they represent and index are key institutional nodal 
points in the production of research and researchers. These 
forms mediate persons, practices, organizations, discourses, 
temporalities and horizons of possibility, apportioning enti-
tlements and obligations, and enjoining future actions.
Ethics committees do crucial, thankless work, conducted 
in and through documents, and as Laura Stark’s (2011) book 
title has it, Behind Closed Doors. The critique of administra-
tive ethics can be enhanced through substantive engagement 
with these documents, and with ethics review as a mundane 
practical activity involving filling in and circulating forms 
(see also Burris & Welsh, 2007; Dixon-Woods, Angell, 
Ashcroft, & Bryman, 2007 attending to correspondence sent 
by ethics committees).
In the following section, I begin with an overview of the 
National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research 
(National Health and Medical Research Council [NHMRC], 
2007). This is the “boss text,” the document at the apex of the 
institutional circuit (Smith & Turner, 2014, p. 10). Following 
this, I trace how the framing of research ethics in this docu-
ment is actualized in local ethics forms, attending particu-
larly to how the forms frame management of sensitivities 
imputed to prospective research participants, and the ethical 
implications of this framing for the person aiming to fill the 
form out successfully. Given that the consent form ultimately 
extends into the actual research encounter from the ethics 
oversight process, and is invariably required and in all 
instances anticipated by the ethics application form, I then 
turn to the institutional function of consent as the means of 
producing commensurable data: ethics clearance as the data-
fication of research.
The National Statement
Australian university Human Research Ethics Committees 
(henceforth: HRECs) administer local ethics protocols and 
procedures in accordance with the National Statement 
(NHMRC, 2007, pp. 68-73). This document defines ethical 
research in Australia through what Halse (2011) calls “prin-
ciplism.” The core principles that undergird ethical research, 
according to the Statement, are research merit and integrity, 
justice and beneficence, and respect for human beings. These 
are phrased, respectively, as follows.
Research with merit and integrity should be
“justifiable by its potential benefit, which may include its 
contribution to knowledge and understanding, to improved 
social welfare and individual wellbeing, and to the skill and 
expertise of researchers . . . designed or developed using 
methods appropriate for achieving the aims of the proposal,” 
and “conducted or supervised by persons or teams with 
experience, qualifications and competence that are appropriate 
for the research.” (NHMRC, 2007, p. 10)
Such research must add something productive to the stock 
of knowledge, but also do this while (or as at least a partial 
consequence of) adhering to appropriate methods and being 
conducted by appropriate persons.
Research that is just is fair:
the selection, exclusion and inclusion of categories of research 
participants is fair . . . the process of recruiting participants is 
fair . . . there is no unfair burden of participation in research on 
particular groups . . . there is fair distribution of the benefits of 
participation in research . . . and there is fair access to the 
benefits of research. (NHMRC, 2007, p. 10)
Where research is beneficent, the “likely benefit of the 
research must justify any risks of harm or discomfort to par-
ticipants. The likely benefit may be to the participants, to the 
wider community, or to both,” and the research has been 
designed “to minimise the risks of harm or discomfort to par-
ticipants,” and to clarify “for participants the potential bene-
fits and risks of the research” (NHMRC, 2007, pp. 10-11).
Finally, having respect for human beings “requires having 
due regard for the welfare, beliefs, perceptions, customs and 
cultural heritage, both individual and collective, of those 
involved in research,” respecting “the privacy, confidentiality 
and cultural sensitivities of the participants and, where rele-
vant, of their communities.” Respect for human beings also 
“involves giving due scope, throughout the research process, 
to the capacity of human beings to make their own decisions 
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. . . empowering them where possible and providing for their 
protection as necessary” (NHMRC, 2007, p. 11).
The emphasis in the Statement is on minimizing possible 
negative effects of the asymmetric relation between researcher 
and researched for the latter party, irrespective of the broader 
social context in which these persons are situated. The research 
participant is figured as “vulnerable,” and several categories 
of persons are predicated as such in the document (including 
Aboriginal people, pregnant women and fetuses, and people 
dependent on medical care). The practical pertinence of this 
vulnerability (and all that ethical research aims to avoid with 
respect to it) is that it is a vulnerability to exploitation by 
unscrupulous researchers. In accord with the medical para-
digm from which the Statement originates, risk of “harm” is 
imagined in a rather immediate, individualized way (some-
thing that may happen to the person signing the consent form). 
The possibility of research critical of elites or of people with 
unpalatable political perspectives does not seem to be envi-
sioned. “Due regard” for the beliefs and customs of partici-
pants is required for research to be ethical, and in the Statement 
(and many instances of the form) an expectation is expressed 
that “Research outcomes should be made accessible to 
research participants” (NHMRC, 2007, p. 10).
These principles (merit, justice, and respect), so defined, 
are both “thin” (perhaps thankfully, in the eyes of some 
researchers), and contestable. For example, why (only) these 
particular principles? Who gets to say what is just or what is 
a fair distribution of the benefits and costs of a particular 
research project? Whatever other questions one might raise, 
researchers seeking institutional approval are under an obli-
gation to ensure (or at least to formulate statements indicat-
ing) that their practices adhere to them.
A more pertinent practical issue than the contestability of 
the principles is how to operationalize them to ensure com-
pliance. The Statement provides for this by transmuting the 
“ends,” or the values underlying the principles, into “means.” 
There are two means, referred to as “themes” in the docu-
ment: proper risk assessment (NHMRC, 2007, pp. 12-15), 
and consent (pp. 16-18).
An important epistemological feature of how ethical 
research is conceptualized is indicated by the emphasis on 
risk assessment and management. It is not just that a given 
project, to be ethical, must exhibit a level of reflexive knowl-
edge about itself. A specific instrumentality in how that 
knowledge is formulated and expressed, and around why it 
ought to be cultivated, is also required.
Ethical research, the Statement implies, is aware of, and 
consequently able to inform participants about, the risks and 
benefits of participation. Irrespective of the topic being 
investigated and the state of knowledge on it, ethical research 
can therefore exhibit in its design something that is already 
known: what the (present and future) risks and benefits of 
that research are to prospective participants. Yet, this can 
never be known with certainty in advance (Markham & 
Buchanan, 2015).
On receiving information on risks and benefits, partici-
pants are in a position to freely consent (or not). Through 
attending to these themes (risk and consent), the principles of 
ethical research (research merit and integrity, justice, benefi-
cence, and respect) are enacted: ethical research follows.
Cynical readers may suspect that the Statement estab-
lishes a procedural alibi, abnegating (or even impeding) the 
processual ethical dynamic characteristic of actual research 
encounters. The temptation is to ponder the implications of a 
rationalist, prophylactic “view from nowhere,” grounded by 
faith in the calculability of risk, and confidence in a calcula-
tive, autonomous, and primarily self-interested individual, 
freely electing to participate once fully apprised of the cost/
benefit analysis of doing so. Such pondering, though, is still 
at one remove from the immediate ethical consequences of 
how “ethical research” is rendered, at the point where the 
form is actually filled out, before research takes place.
An important feature of ethical research as imagined in the 
Statement and related documents, is that it is evidenced and 
administered in this way, via documentation, and that by infer-
ence the documents so circulated demonstrate and have appro-
priate oversight: an institutionally supported and approved 
hierarchical range of persons tasked with the management, 
review, and storage of these documents. Ethical research is 
expressed as a culture, essentially, of documentation. Discrete 
practices occurring at different times and places are coordi-
nated and assured through the circulation of documents. 
Documentation and proper processes of documentation over-
see, safeguard and guarantee ethical research behavior. These 
documents are the material delegates, the organizational sanc-
tion and memory of ethical research practice.
The Statement is a document detailing what ethical 
research is, which points procedurally forward at two other 
documents as its lieutenants. Risk assessment and consent 
are operationalized—one might say, entextualized—by these 
two documents. Risk assessment is overseen through an 
application submitted to the HREC prior to commencement 
of research (where a project so approved will also require 
reporting on its conduct and progress). This application uti-
lizes a standardized template, designed to ensure the pro-
posed project complies with the Statement. Approval of that 
application will entail a consent procedure, almost inevitably 
involving a consent form (for which standard templates 
abound), which research participants will be required to sign.
The NHMRC has a standardized online template for HREC 
applications, the National Ethics Application Framework 
(NEAF). At the time of writing, the NEAF is being replaced 
by a new system, the Human Research Ethics Application 
(HREA). In both instances, users set up an account, complete 
the form, and submit it to the relevant HREC or HRECs. The 
NEAF and the HREA are dynamic forms: the appearance of 
certain questions depends on previous answers given. The 
template is usually required for multi-site applications (appli-
cations for research conducted at one or more universities and/
or another institution, such as a hospital), and at some 
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universities it is required for “high risk” research: as per the 
Statement, research which may lead to physical, psychologi-
cal, social, economic or legal harm (NHMRC, 2007, p. 13). 
Only one of the sample universities uses it for all applications. 
Most use their own forms, modeled on the NEAF. These are 
usually available from university websites, although in a few 
instances an institutional login is required.1
‘Doing Ethics’: Scripting Ethical 
Handling of Research Participants’ 
Concerns
It is to these local forms that we now direct attention. The 
local media ecology where they can be encountered is indic-
ative of how they are intended to be approached: the support 
offered (as per the HREA website and several university 
websites) is largely oriented to filling them out as efficiently 
and quickly as possible. There is guidance on forgotten pass-
words, the functions of the numerous icons in the HREA, 
and tips on naïvely true answers which will trigger further, 
impossible questions (e.g., if your study will exclude cogni-
tively impaired persons, don’t answer “yes” to that question, 
because the form will then ask you how you will access peo-
ple’s medical records to demonstrate this).
The forms consist of batteries of questions, many in check-
list form. In every instance, there are questions addressing: the 
“merit” of the project, its “scientificity” (asking for details 
concerning whether the project has been peer reviewed, and 
what kind of quantitative or qualitative analysis will be con-
ducted); what outcomes are anticipated; who will conduct the 
research and their roles, qualifications and expertise; whether 
there is conflict of interest for the researchers; how consent 
will be handled; whether participants will be reimbursed; what 
kinds of procedures the research involves; what kinds of ben-
efits and risks are involved for participants, how risks will be 
managed and mitigated (including in some instances risks to 
researchers, and risks to the University); what kinds of persons 
will be recruited and how (in one instance: “the projected 
number, sex and age range of participants [including inclusion 
and exclusion criteria]”); whether “hot” persons (particularly, 
people unable to give consent due to impairment or disability, 
people dependent on medical care, pregnant women and 
fetuses, minors, and Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander 
people, who in some iterations of the form are given a distinct 
check box from the one marked “Human participants”) or top-
ics (suicide, mental illness, drug abuse, grief and death, termi-
nation of pregnancy and so on) will be involved; and how the 
data will be handled (stored, and whether identifiable, re-iden-
tifiable, or non-identifiable).
In terms of how “research” is formally characterized and 
established as an approved activity—the shape research is 
required to take to conform to the logic of practice the forms 
demand—two core accomplishments of the forms are 
described in the pages below. The first is the moral orientation 
toward research participants, which the forms obligate the user 
to profess (the ethics of the ethics, so to speak). This has been 
noted by others critically analyzing ethics review processes in 
other countries, albeit without emphasis on the forms them-
selves (Lincoln, 2005; Thomas, 2004). The second (which the 
form instantiates, and enacts) is a primary definition of 
research as the “collection” of data, indicative of the role-
played by the form in larger institutional processes.
The forms are designed with these accomplishments in 
mind, and this becomes clear in attending to some of the 
questioning across iterations of the form. The application 
documents often mobilize hierarchies of persons, as in this 
list:
Mark the categories relevant to this proposal.
Healthy members of the community
University students
Employees of a specific company/organisation
Members of a specific community group, club or association
Clients of a service provider
Health Service clients (e.g. users/clients of a health service)
School children
Hospital in-patients
Clinical clients (e.g. patients)
Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander people
Members of socially disadvantaged groups
Cadavers/ cadaveric organs
Other (please specify): ___
This list starts from a center of “normal,” and proceeds 
through Dantean circles of institutional and social mortifica-
tion. Ostensibly a reverse ranking of research “vulnerabil-
ity,” the list is a descent into structural inequality. The closer 
one gets to the bottom of the list (the more marked the social 
category), the more evidence required that institutionally 
sanctioned gatekeepers support the project.
In a similar instance:
Does the research specifically target participants from any 
of the following groups?
1.  Members of a socially identifiable group with special 
cultural or religious needs or political vulnerabilities
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2.  People able to be identified in any final report when 
specific consent for this has not been given
3.  People highly dependent on medical care
4.  People in a workplace setting with the potential for 
coercion or problems of confidentiality (e.g. employer/ 
employee)
5.  People in a dependent or unequal relationship with the 
researchers (e.g. lecturer/student, doctor/patient, teacher/
pupil, professional/client)
6.  People not usually considered vulnerable but would be 
thought so in the context of the project
7.  People unable to give free informed consent because of 
difficulties in understanding the Plain Language 
Statement or Information Sheet (e.g. language difficulties)
8.  People whose ability to give consent is impaired
9.  People with a physical disability or vulnerability
10.  People with existing relationships with the researcher 
(e.g. relative, friend, co-worker)
11. Residents of a custodial institution
12.  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, communities or 
groups
Here, the groups exhibit a diversity of range: groups 2, 5, 
6, 10 and arguably 7 and 8 are produced through the inter-
vention of the research project itself. Some of the other 
groups (such as 1, 11, and 12) are categorically invoked in 
and of themselves, absenting any particular researcher’s 
interests in them. That is to say, these groups are nominal-
ized, and thereby normalized, as research-salient categories, 
where this status is a consequence of existing social arrange-
ments rather than an emergent feature of a given research 
intervention. The form anticipates interest in these catego-
ries, and prefigures such interest as something the researcher 
should be prepared to account for.
Another important implication of the list above is that, in 
mobilizing these distinct categories as salient, it bundles the 
principles of the Statement. Some of these categories warrant 
respect on account of their vulnerability (e.g., 3 and 9), some 
of them are entitled to respect in accordance with cultural 
sensitivities (1 and 12), and some of them could compromise 
the merit of a particular project (2, 5, and 6). The appearance 
of these latter groups demonstrates how the principles suf-
fuse the questioning in the forms. Category 2, for example, 
implies that data have not been successfully de-identified 
(poor data handling lacks merit), that proper consent was not 
secured (such that participants were not granted sufficient 
respect, but also via a process failure lacking merit), and that 
both omissions were carried through to final reporting. By 
the latter, the project and the researchers lacked merit, expos-
ing themselves and their host institution to reputational risk. 
The principles of the Statement thus rebound or ricochet 
around how categories of prospective participants are formu-
lated in the ethics applications.
We can slow the trouble in the form down further. 
Consider the form as the site of a kind of drama involving a 
few key players. First, we have the form itself as the techni-
cal instrument proxied by or standing for the HREC, which 
itself stands for the imagined research community and the 
institutional context defining and facilitating research as 
such. The form in its entirety plays this role and is phrased as 
having assumed the rights and entitlements to do so. In turn, 
the form is the medium by which the applicant officially 
enters the institutionally approved research community, and 
thus requires the researcher to write in conformity with the 
genre parameters of the form. The researcher and the project 
must be phrased so as to be legible as instances of the genre.
Second, we have prospective research participants. The 
form (quite literally) frames others as warranting protection 
from researchers, or at the least, suggests these others ought 
to be left alone by them, such that any stated intention to do 
otherwise entails an appropriate justification. The form 
knows better than the researcher, and presents itself as an 
intervention or gatekeeper (which it is). Although that is how 
the issue I am interested in becomes visible, it is not what I 
am interested in here.
Third, we have the researcher. What I am emphasizing here 
is not that the researcher is required to occupy a particular sub-
ject position (although, as I will show presently, she is). I am 
not interested in how the form works as a kind of Foucauldian 
discursive technology (Guta et al., 2013; Halse & Honey, 
2007). Rather, I want to highlight the moral position the 
researcher is required to assume and describe in relation to 
prospective research participants, to get the form through.
With respect to these participants, the form divests from 
the researcher and bestows on the HREC the position 
researchers are deemed unsuitable to take independently. 
The form is to provide the HREC with enough information to 
act on behalf of participants, by determining for or against 
the proposed research described in the form. Through the 
form, the HREC is thus granted exactly the kind of power 
prospective participants are apparently being protected from: 
the HREC decides for them (Juritzen, Grimen, & Heggen, 
2011, p. 646).
At the same time that the form apportions power, respon-
sibility and control in this way, it drives the applicant to for-
mulate respect for prospective participants in a way which is 
at cross purposes with the ostensible objective (i.e., it is not 
respectful to participants or, incidentally, to researchers). 
This becomes more explicit in free text as opposed to check 
box instances:
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Is the research targeting any particular ethnic or community 
group?
Yes
No
(See National Statement 4—Ethical consideration specific to 
participants, 4.7—Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, 
4.8—People in other countries)
If you answered “No,” proceed to SECTION 4
If you answered “Yes,” which group is being targeted?
Will recruitment be conducted in consultation with a 
representative of this group?
Yes
No
(a) If you have not consulted a representative of this group, 
please provide your reasons for not undertaking any consultation.
(b) If you have consulted a representative, with whom have you 
consulted?
How do they represent this group?
The implications of the conflation of “any particular eth-
nic or community group” with the categories “Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Peoples” and “People in other 
countries” are for current purposes especially illuminating. 
Clearly, some people are of interest to researchers primarily 
in terms of their culture or ethnicity (and this targeting can 
itself be ethical). By the same measure, there are other peo-
ple (specifically, people who devise and fill out forms like 
this), whose culture or ethnicity is of interest to us on account 
of its exscription within the bounded space produced and 
held by the form (Nancy & Lydon, 1990). The tacit ethnic 
center of Australia, both indexed and occupied by the form, 
is thereby exposed. The form erases or evacuates the con-
crete social positions from which it is to be filled out, and 
from which it is to be read. The situated location where the 
producers and users of the form encounter each other to doc-
ument the practical ethics of the future research encounter is 
depopulated, and yet demands a clear and unambiguous 
report on the anticipated sensibilities of others elsewhere 
(where the researcher herself is presumed not to be such an 
other, and to accept and enter dialogue from this shared 
position).
The very fact of the existence of the form and its being 
filled out is (for all the emphasis on research cost/benefit 
reflexivity) certainly not to be taken as an instance of culture 
or ethnicity, it is “above” or “over” culture and ethnicity, and 
legislates them as things one ought to be careful about 
stumbling around in, like wildflowers or mushrooms. The 
form positions itself as beyond or outside of culture, as hav-
ing no culture at all:
Consider whether the project requires ethical or cultural approval 
by other bodies. If yes, name the other bodies and provide 
evidence of the permissions.
Ethical considerations may exist relating to participants’ 
perceptions, beliefs, customs and/or cultural heritage. Are there 
considerations of this kind specific to this research? If so, please 
specify and explain how the research design has addressed them.
Consider whether the project requires the researchers to be 
aware of, and use, culturally appropriate practices for any reason 
(national, social, professional). If yes, explain what they are and 
outline how this will be managed.
Running respect and proper attendance to future risk/benefit 
evaluations together implies a research encounter where it is 
already known exactly what sensitivity or consideration might 
arise. To require such an (unethical) assertion of knowledge 
from the researcher is itself arguably unethical, as it presumes 
the researcher knows in advance what someone else thinks is 
culturally significant and, in a slight refrain, does not need to 
bother to check with anyone whether they are right about that. 
The understanding of ethics is unilateral, projected by the expert 
applicant filling out the form, and the entire research process is 
to be narrated a priori as structured in this way. The form asks 
for too much, and asks that it be expressed as too little.
This is distinct from the peculiar epistemological assump-
tion that the researcher knows enough about what she wants 
to find out about to know what is sensitive about it, but needs 
nonetheless to go and find out just a little bit more about it 
(not so much, after all, that she might not know in advance 
any more whether or not or how it is sensitive).
The form, in short, requires the researcher to document 
their practice in an unethical way, in that they cannot know 
all of this in advance: they must present disingenuously to 
the HREC to “pass.” Furthermore, nor should they claim 
beforehand that they already know this about other people 
(because they ought not presume to know who might deem 
what a significant consideration along these lines, indepen-
dent of the presumption that this is a particular and exclusive 
feature of the categories of persons deemed culturally sensi-
tive in just this way).
Research is conducted ethically when researchers cannot 
“see,” or rather are prepared in advance to disavow, the 
contingency and immanence of ethical engagement in the 
field (both unforeseen ethical dilemmas, and unanticipated 
actual insight into ethical practice). Assurances of this dis-
avowal are required to conduct research, and more perti-
nently, to write it up, and thereby transmute findings into 
media suitable for circulation. As we will now see, ethics 
approval is the warrant for such circulation: the approved 
project is just as ethical as all the other approved projects.
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Because discrepant practices are treated as equivalent under 
the banner of “research,” HRECs are required to evaluate 
like with unlike. The form is the locus of standardization for 
this process. In being rendered through the form as a thresh-
old into the systems of value by which the political economy 
of academic research functions, all approved projects become 
equivalent. The form sacrifices the complexity of engage-
ment at the altar of commensurability.
This is the organizational accomplishment of the form: 
inaugurating research as a practice constituted by the collec-
tion of data. In all instances, a central line of questioning 
formulates research in these terms and asks how data will be 
collected, analyzed, and stored:
Data Security
Who will own the data?
 . . .
Will any of the data be retained for ongoing use (e.g. databank, 
archive, tissue bank)? If so, please provide details. Explicit 
consent must be obtained for this.
How long will the data be stored? If it is not being stored, please 
provide an ethical justification for this.
The minimum storage period for university research is 5 years 
after the project is completed.
Ethics are at this juncture attenuated to ensuring clarity 
for participants with respect to the information arising from 
research as a form of property, while research is figured as 
data extraction:
Consider ownership of the information, in terms of both where 
local and traditional knowledge are involved and where personal 
information is being collected. It is important that participants 
are clear about who will own the information and the outputs.
What control, if any, will participants have over the information 
gained from or about them?
In a blunter example:
Who will own the resulting research data and the created 
intellectual property?
Place an “X” in the relevant box/es below—at least one box 
must be checked. If relevant you can check more than one box
Research formulated as an extractive process here sharp-
ens the meaning of “ethical” to a point that not only permits 
but entails such extraction. To be an ethical researcher in the 
world conjured by the form is to take something and segment 
it effectively from who and where it was taken from, render-
ing it discrete material. Only when it has been properly sepa-
rated from its context does it become data, something that 
can be collected and owned (Markham, 2013).
As Ana Gross (2012) explains, ethics documentation 
enables the production of data (sets) by untethering what she 
calls “vital emissions” (utterances, practices, biological 
material, other features of human life) from their individual 
“authors,” recombining, aggregating, and categorizing them 
as commensurable with other such emissions produced by 
others. The “social” of “social research” is thereby produced, 
an aggregate or equivalence class. Ethics review is the insti-
tutional guarantor of methodologically and ethically sound 
commensuration and equivalence (van der Vlist, 2016, 
pp. 2-3). Data have been “dividualized,” amputated from 
their context, standardized and objectified in the proper way.
The ethics approval form (specifically, in its projection of 
the consent document) is the formal mechanism initiating 
research as datafication for the applicant. Informed consent 
acts as a “surrogate property contract” (Gross, 2012, p. 119). 
Through the consent document, participants relinquish 
“rights” in some feature of their vital emissions and any fur-
ther value that may arise from their use. This is what renders 
the matter of persons into thinglike data.
Data rendered commensurable in this way, and the out-
puts that arise from them, can be circulated into networks of 
equivalence, exchange, and ownership. Their positions and 
worth can be calculated in regimes of value and rank (IP, 
H-index, journal rankings, “impact” metrics, and so on). The 
ethics approval form is thus in procedural terms a substrate 
document, introducing researchers and research into the sys-
tems of evaluation which assign reputational and economic 
currency to research, to researchers, and to their institutions.
Conclusion
Ethics forms are intended and designed as texts-in-use. They 
are not meant to be read: they are meant to be filled out. 
What is asked and what is not asked, the order and format of 
the questions, constitute and impose a representation of a 
preferred vision of research activity. What warrants attention 
is “the shape created by the gaps in the form” (Riles, 2013, 
p. 562). The shapes the questions take make tangible a kind 
of meta-data moral ontology, what can be known or should 
be said to be known at the outset by competent researchers, 
and what ought to be known, what is sufficient to be known, 
about what researchers are doing, in order for it to be said 
that their works is “up to scratch” ethically.
The ethics review form claims a monopoly in ethical 
oversight, including over investigations that may trouble par-
ticipants’ normative cultural frames. Beyond instantiating 
just such a frame itself, the form is a constitutive gatekeeper 
in the institutional organization of research culture.
Perhaps a counterargument would assert that the ethical 
standard the forms have been held to in the pages above 
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comes from a different domain, and is not suitable for appli-
cation here. It is this mechanical functionalism that provides 
the forms with their own ethical escape route. To allow this 
as routine, sliding into an ethically evacuated void between 
means and ends, is to practice doublethink.
As a compulsory ritual process, the form is ethically con-
sequential in that it asks all who encounter it to turn a blind 
eye to those features of it that have been discussed here. As it 
mobilizes personnel around it, it also sits in their world as a 
mute assertion of discrepancy, requiring their complicity. 
The process the form instantiates requires conformity; the 
shrug and knowing wink to get things done. Few people who 
routinely encounter such forms wish to be deemed unethical 
researchers. Many encounter them in the course of activities 
for which they receive salaries. The form, in more than one 
way, evidences and constitutes the power dynamics of 
research ethics as a living institutional practice, in the social 
world of the university and as the procedural hinterland to 
the encounter with the other that is called “research.”
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